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ABSTRACT
Objectives: In economic evaluations future health and monetary out-
comes are commonly discounted at equal and constant rates. The theo-
retical foundation of this practice is being debated and appropriate
discount rates for costs and health effects are sought. Here, we have
derived social discount rates for health, money, and environmental beneﬁts
by means of a choice experiment.
Methods: All choices were framed from a social perspective. We investi-
gated differences in time preference by domain (health, monetary beneﬁts,
environmental beneﬁts), time delay (5, 10, and 40 years), and respondent
characteristics. Respondents were 173 health-care professionals and 34
health policymakers. Choice titration was used to determine when the
respondent was indifferent between future and present beneﬁts.
Results: At least two-thirds of respondents preferred an intervention with
immediate beneﬁts to delayed beneﬁts in the different domains. The
median (mean) yearly discount rates for health beneﬁts were 2.7%
(10.7%), 1.3% (3.5%), and 1.1% (2.3%) assuming a 5, 10, and 40 years
delay, respectively. Social time preference for monetary beneﬁts was sig-
niﬁcantly stronger, with median (mean) yearly discount rates of 6.6%
(18.7%) and 4.8% (11.2%) assuming a 5 and 10 years delay, respectively.
The social time preference with regard to environmental beneﬁts was
similar to the monetary beneﬁts. Social time preference for the different
domains was signiﬁcantly correlated at the individual level.
Conclusions: The empirically derived social time preference is in line with
current theoretical arguments for a lower discount rate for health beneﬁts
than formonetary beneﬁts.Moreover, the impliedmedian discount rates for
health were lower than those commonly used or advocated in guidelines.
Keywords: decision tasks, discounting, public choice, social time
preference.
Introduction
Discounting is a common procedure in economic evaluations to
adjust future costs and effects for their timing, giving lower
weight to more distant outcomes. Although the general need for
discounting future events is fairly undisputed, the height of the
discount rates is heavily debated. The issue is far from trivial
because the inﬂuence of different discount rates on the cost-
effectiveness ratios of interventions can be substantial [1]. As
such, small changes in the discount rates applied for costs and
effects may importantly affect resource allocation decisions
informed by economic evaluations. In the search for appropriate
discount rates for costs and effects to be used in economic evalu-
ations, two broad streams of literature may be distinguished.
First, there is a more theoretical stream of literature address-
ing the question of how costs and effects ought to be discounted
in economic evaluations. A central question in this literature
whether health effects and costs should be discounted at the same
rate. There is a broad practical consensus to discount costs and
effects at equal rates, which seems importantly based on two
theoretical arguments [2,3]; the consistency argument of Wein-
stein and Stason [4] and the postponement paradox argument of
Keeler and Cretin [5]. Both these arguments have been ques-
tioned in terms of their relevance and their validity [1,2,6,7].
Most importantly, the consistency argument was shown to rest
upon the idea of a constant value of health effects over time,
which is unrealistic [7]. Because the conventional reasons to
discount costs and effects at the same rate are thus increasingly
abandoned, new discounting rules have been proposed, in which
differential rather than uniform discounting was advocated
[1,8,9]. Differential discounting allows a lower discount rate for
health, relative to that for costs in order to correct for the
increasing value of health over time. Whether these new insights
will result in a new consensus and clear guidance on appropriate
discount rates for costs and effects to be used in economic evalu-
ations remains to be seen.
The second stream of literature and an alternative route of
coming to appropriate discount rates for costs and health out-
comes could be the elicitation of time preference for health and
money in the general public, which would ensure that the nor-
mative judgments incorporated in economic evaluations are in
line with social preferences [10]. Many empirical enquiries have
explored the subject of time preference for health and money
with inconsistent results. The outcomes differ widely, from nega-
tive or low discount rates to very high discount rates for both
health and money. Differences have been ascribed to differences
in time delays and study populations, applying a social or an
individual perspective, and framing issues [11]. These studies
generally applied a stated preference approach, often used unrep-
resentative (for instance in terms of age) convenience samples
commonly consisting of students, often unfamiliar with choices
in the health-care sector. Moreover, the elicitation methods for
time preference usually were cognitively demanding, whereas the
experiments normally referred only loosely to the underlying
public choices. Also, the exact choice offered sometimes
remained unclear. For instance, a clear separation of timing of
health effects and age of beneﬁciaries is not always made. It can
thus be questioned whether time preferences derived in these
experiments can be used in the context of social decisions.
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An intriguing difference between the empirical and more
theoretical streams of literature is that they, in general, point in
two different directions. Many empirical studies report stronger
time preference for health than for money, where the theoretical
literature points in the opposite direction, i.e., lower discount
rates for health relative to money [8,11]. One may relate this
difference also to the design of and perspective chosen in empiri-
cal studies.
Indeed, how to obtain socially relevant time preferences from
individuals is an important issue in the context of ﬁnding appro-
priate discount rates for economic evaluations through time pre-
ference elicitation. Some have argued that the elicitation of
individual time preference is not particularly helpful in coming to
an appropriate social discount rate. Individuals may have various
motives to prefer present to future consumption, such as per-
ceived individual mortality risk, life plans, opportunity costs, and
myopia (for an extensive discussion, see [12]). From a societal
perspective the arguments for time preference, or their magni-
tude, may be different because the lifespan of individuals is more
limited than that of society. Moreover, it has been claimed that
individual time preference insufﬁciently takes into consideration
the interests of future generations, and would even be “irratio-
nal” in the context of public choices [13,14]. Pigou [14] argued
that the state should protect current and future generations from
the time preference of current generations. As a result, weighting
the interests of current and future generations also involves
ethical and political judgments that should be distinguished from
empirically derived individual preferences concerning the future
[15–18]. Others have argued in that context that health beneﬁts
should not be discounted or at a rate close to zero because, in
contrast to money, there is no market for health at which current
health can be invested in order to gain more health in the future,
and because discounting would bias against valuable prevention
programmes with long term health effects [15]. Albeit that the
interests of future generations might need speciﬁc guarantees,
future health gains must be discounted somehow because utility
maximization would otherwise require excessive sacriﬁce from
the current generation, and future generations would become
“utility monsters” [19]. Koopmans called this “the paradox of
the indeﬁnitely postponed splurge” [20]. Moreover, if one
accepts that health gains represent (also) a monetary value,
whether presented as natural units or as utilities, it is clear that
consistency requires that health should be discounted, similar as
costs [4].
However, this does not necessarily precludes empirical esti-
mations of social time preference elicited in current generations.
Indeed, Sen and Baumol make the important distinction between
individuals’ private and social preferences that need not be the
same [21,22], i.e., choices for oneself may be different from
choices made for or on behalf of society. A good understanding
of the underlying public choice context among participants of
social time preference studies is pivotal therefore.
In this article, we present an empirical study to determine
social time preference for health and money. Our choice experi-
ment tried to accommodate the aforementioned considerations:
an explanation of the underlying public choices, maximum
clarity, and transparency of choice tasks; a precise deﬁnition of
the decision context; a clear distinction between time and popu-
lation age in the choice tasks; and a deliberately selected, hetero-
geneous sample familiar with choices in health care. We tested
whether preferences differed between health and money. In order
to further test whether social time preference differs between
domains, a choice task containing environmental scenarios was
added. Furthermore, we investigated the strength of social time
preference for health and money for different delays, the corre-
lation of time preferences for different domains at the individual
level, and the relationship with individual characteristics.
Methods
Questionnaire
We designed a computer-based questionnaire that could be
accessed via the Internet, with a number of choice tasks. In this
article we present the results of four choice tasks with health
scenarios, two with monetary scenarios, and one with environ-
mental scenarios.
Choice Context
All scenarios were framed from an explicit public choice perspec-
tive. Respondents were asked to imagine that the government
was confronted with a choice between two mutually exclusive
scenarios or interventions with speciﬁed consequences. They
were asked which scenario would be most justiﬁed from a
general interest point of view, even in case they could have
personal beneﬁt from one of the scenarios. This viewpoint was
thought to come close to a Rawlsian decision-maker acting
behind a “veil of ignorance” [23].
Choice Tasks
The health scenarios differed in the timing of health beneﬁts that
would occur either in the current year (scenario A) or with a
delay of 5, 10, or 40 years (scenario B). Nevertheless, the age
group to which health beneﬁts would accrue was kept constant
(i.e., age 50) to avoid that age preference would disturb the
elicitation of time preference. As a result, the choice implied a
distribution of health across two birth cohorts. In the ﬁrst choice,
task health beneﬁts were deﬁned as lives saved (5-year delay),
and in the subsequent, three tasks as healthy life-years gained (5-,
10-, and 40-year delay), to test whether the use of different
though related outcome measures would inﬂuence the prefer-
ences. The concept “healthy life-years” was ﬁrst explained in lay
terms by indicating that more or less life-years can be lost
depending on the age at death, and that all life-years gained by
interventions in the choice scenarios are spent in good health. We
did not state anything about the distribution of healthy life-years
gained across the population, thereby avoiding those distribu-
tional concerns that would have impact on the preferences. The
choice tasks containing health scenarios with a delay of 10 or 40
years were randomized, so each respondent was offered three
choice experiments with health scenarios (two with 5 years, one
with 10 or 40 years). The patient groups and types of interven-
tion were deliberately kept unspeciﬁed in the health scenarios to
avoid labeling effects. The interventions in all health scenarios
had similar costs.
Each choice task consisted of three steps. First, a choice
needed to be made between scenarios A and B that produced
equal amounts of health beneﬁts but with different delays. The
starting values were 100 lives saved (ﬁrst choice task) or 1000
healthy life-years gained (subsequent choice tasks). Preferences
for A or B were elicited with a nine-point rating scale. Second, if
respondents preferred A (B) or were indifferent, they were asked
whether they would shift to B (A) if the size of the health beneﬁts
of A (B) would decrease. Third, respondents who answered “yes”
or “do not know” were routed to an interactive titration task in
which the health beneﬁts of A (B) were decreased following a
predeﬁned algorithm, until they were indifferent between A and
B. The algorithm was that the beneﬁts of the preferred option
were reduced to 0.8 times the starting value, and unless the
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alternative option was chosen, successively to 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05,
0.02, 0.01, 0.005, 0.002, and 0.001 times the starting value.
When the alternative option was chosen, a ping-pong procedure
was followed by offering the middle value in between the pre-
ceding values. The lowest possible volume of health beneﬁts was
therefore one thousandth of the starting value, corresponding
with a maximum substitution elasticity of 1000. The titration
task was graphically supported with a bar chart. Respondents
who answered “no” in the second step were not offered the
trade-off game, and were labeled as lexicographic respondents.
We designed these three steps (rating scale → question → titra-
tion task) in order to clearly mark the titration task as a stimulus
by which nonobservable time preference for real population
health can be elicited. An example of a complete choice task is
presented in the Supporting Information Appendix for this article
at http://www.ispor.org/Publications/value/ViHsupplementary/
ViH13i4_Meerding.asp.
The two choice tasks with monetary scenarios were presented
as an instant monetary beneﬁt of €100 million that would accrue
to the Secretary of Finance in the current year (option A) or with
a delay of 5 or 10 years (option B). Again respondents were asked
which situation they would prefer from a general interest point of
view. The choice taskswithmonetary scenarios contained only the
titration task and not the two preceding steps. In the titration task,
the monetary beneﬁts of the preferred situation were decreased
until the respondent was indifferent between both situations,
following the same algorithm as in the health scenarios.
In order to gain further evidence on whether social time
preference differs between different economic goods or domains,
we added a choice task with environmental scenarios. These were
two measures for reducing environmental noise for households
living near a highway: noise barriers that would result in imme-
diate relief for 1000 households, or low-noise asphalt. The
asphalt would be equally effective but could be applied only after
10 years. Both measures had similar costs. In the titration task
the number of households beneﬁting was used as commodity to
trade. We chose noise as example because it is a commonly
experienced environmental problem and because it is not sub-
stantially related to health, in contrast to many other environ-
mental problems.
After completion of each choice task, respondents were asked
to substantiate their choice. If negative, they were requested to
repeat the choice task.
Other Questionnaire Parts
The choice tasks were preceded by a careful introduction into the
policy context and the aim of the questionnaire, questions on
personal characteristics including health behavior, and a number
of propositions concerning the willingness to trade-off individual
present and future consumption, and about the value of the
health and wealth of future generations. At the end of the ques-
tionnaire respondents were asked how they evaluated the
questionnaire.
Study Population
We recruited health-care workers in Erasmus Medical Center
(MC) by email and ﬂyers, and put extra efforts in recruiting
medical doctors. We found 246 persons willing to participate.
Nevertheless, 73 persons could not be traced because of wrong
email addresses, did not participate, had incomplete question-
naires, or faced technical difﬁculties. Hence, the questionnaire
was completed by 173 health-care workers. In addition, we
invited 56 health policymakers in several government adminis-
trations related to health policy of whom 34 participated. Basic
statistics of the respondents are presented in Table 1. Compared
to all Erasmus MC employees, persons in managerial, adminis-
trative, or staff functions, paramedical personnel, and older
employees were underrepresented in our sample, and medical
doctors, nurses and operating room personnel were overrepre-
sented. We lack sociodemographic data of those health policy-
makers who did not respond.
We chose health-care workers and health policymakers for
several reasons. We assumed some familiarity with the choice
tasks as they face similar decisions in their professional practice.
Moreover, the complexity of the questionnaire required a rela-
tively educated sample to safeguard a valid response. In addition,
we were interested if policymakers, who are particularly apt to
make decisions on behalf of society, would have different pre-
ferences than health-care workers. A ﬁnancial incentive was
offered to the health-care workers to enhance participation.
Data Analysis
Social time preference was expressed as the ratio (Y) of the
volume of future beneﬁts (health, money) considered equal to
one present beneﬁt. A value of Y < 1, Y = 1, and Y > 1 means
that a respondent has a negative, zero, or positive time prefer-
ence, respectively. The implied yearly discount rate assuming a
constant discount function can then be calculated for each time
horizon (5, 10, and 40 years) separately with the formula:
r = Y1/t, with r being the discount rate, and T the delay in future
beneﬁts in years. From the choice tasks with time delays of 0–10
and 0–40 years, implied discount rates were calculated for the
periods 5–10 years and 10–40 years given the discount rates
derived from the choice tasks with time delays or 0–5 and 0–10
years, respectively.
Because of the skewed distribution of the data, we applied
nonparametric tests: Spearman’s rank correlation for correla-
tions and Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test for differences between
elicited preferences. The relation between time preference and
background characteristics was also investigated with nonpara-
metric testing (Mann–Whitney and Kruskal–Wallis) and with
multivariate regression analysis using the rankings of the prefer-
ences as dependent variable.
When respondents preferred option A on the rating scale and
option B in the subsequent titration task (or vice versa) responses
were regarded inconsistent. Responses were also regarded incon-
sistent when, given a positive (negative) time preference, the ratio
of future to present beneﬁts (Y) was larger (smaller) in the choice
task with a delay of 5 years compared to 10 or 40 years. For
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of sample
N = 207 %
Age
<30 65 31.4
30–39 64 30.9
40–49 48 23.2
50+ 30 14.5
Sex
Males 78 37.7
Females 129 62.3
Job
General, administrative 32 15.5
Scientiﬁc, medical doctors 55 26.6
Nurses, paramedical personnel 86 41.5
Policymakers 34 16.4
Education
Less than high school 48 23.2
High school or higher 159 76.8
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example, this is the case when a respondent was indifferent
between 500 life-years gained now and 1000 life-years gained in
5 years, and between >500 life-years gained now and 1000
life-years gained in 10 or 40 years. The reverse is applicable when
a respondent demonstrated a negative time preference. Correla-
tions of inconsistent response with background characteristics
were tested with chi-square.
In contrast to inconsistent responses, lexicographic respon-
dents were excluded from the analysis of choices between health
scenarios. Lexicographic respondents were unwilling to trade
present for future health beneﬁts, which may imply extreme time
preference, a misunderstanding of the question, or other motives.
Because they did not ﬁt within our measurement framework for
eliciting preferences, they did not produce analyzable data.
Validity Checks
The questionnaire was pre-tested in a pilot. In addition to the
analysis of inconsistent data and lexicographic respondents, we
checked the validity of the questionnaire by semistructured tele-
phone interviews with 8 respondents (out of 12 who were
approached) about 2 weeks after completion of the questionnaire
(“debrieﬁng”). We investigated whether respondents had under-
stood the task by asking their opinion on the aim of the ques-
tionnaire and the understandability of questions and concepts.
We collected additional information for interpreting answers
they had given on the choice tasks by asking what their consid-
erations had been. We also asked whether they would still give
the same answers, how they evaluated taking a decision-maker’s
perspective and deciding upon other people’s lives, and how they
experienced the task burden.
Results
Inconsistent and Lexicographic Response
Of 207 respondents, 19 (9.2%) gave at least one inconsistent
answer on the choice tasks for health scenarios, by preferring
option B on the rating scale and option A in the titration task or
vice versa. Persons who found the questionnaire very difﬁcult
(17.6% of sample) were more likely to give an inconsistent
answer (odds ratio 3.5; 95% conﬁdence interval 1.3–9.6). In
addition, 25 (12.1%) respondents reported higher valuations of
healthy life-years in 10 or 40 years compared to healthy life-years
in 5 years, and 33 (15.9%) respondents had higher valuations of
monetary beneﬁts in 10 years compared to 5 years. No signiﬁcant
associations with background characteristics were found. Incon-
sistent responses were not excluded from the analyses.
In the choice tasks containing health scenarios, 6.3%, 8.2%,
18.5%, and 29.9% of respondents were not willing to trade
present for future health in the choice experiments with a delay
of 5 years (lives saved) and of 5, 10, and 40 years (healthy
life-years gained), respectively.
Social Time Preference for Health
Social time preference for health showed a large variation.
Because no signiﬁcant differences in valuations were observed
between health beneﬁts measured in healthy life-years gained or
in lives saved, we comment on only the results relating to healthy
life-years gained. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of
the valuation of future compared to present healthy life-years (Y)
for different delays. The steep increase around Y = 1 indicates
that a considerable portion of respondents had no or a weak time
preference (Y < 2). A minority of respondents had negative
(Y < 1) or a very strong time preference (Y > 2). The curves for
T = 10 and T = 40 with longer delays are to the right of the curve
for T = 5, which means a lower preference for health beneﬁts in
the distant future than in the nearby future, as expected. Differ-
ences in time preference for different time delays were all signiﬁ-
cant (P < 0.05) and in the expected direction. The majority of
respondents would prefer the gain of future healthy life-years if
at least 1.14, 1.14, and 1.54 life-years (value of median Y) can be
gained at T = 5, T = 10, and T = 40, respectively, compared to
one life-year gained in the current year. This corresponds to a
median yearly discount rate of 2.7% (5-year delay), 1.3% (10-
year delay), and 1.1% (40-year delay) as shown in Table 2.
Figure 1 Cumulative percentage of respondents who prefer future life-years
gained.
————— T = 5 years
– – – – – – – T = 10 years
···················· T = 40 years
Table 2 Implied time preference rates for health, money, and environmental beneﬁts
Domain Health Money Environment
Unit Lives Life-years Euros Households
Delay (in years) 5 5 10 40 5 10 10
N* 194 190 106† 54† 203 202 195
Zero time preference (%) 25.3 25.8 17.0 14.8 8.7 6.8 4.3
Mean 0.1366 0.1070 0.0352 0.0228 0.1873 0.1122 0.1120
Median 0.0271 0.0271 0.0134 0.0108 0.0664 0.0481 0.0481
25% percentile 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0271 0.0258 0.0258
75% percentile 0.0986 0.0986 0.0481 0.0216 0.1375 0.0893 0.1190
*Analyzable response, i.e., exclusive lexicographic responders and nonresponders. Total N = 207.
†Among the healthcare workers sample, the choice tasks with time delays of 10 and 40 years were randomized. The policy makers sample received the choice task with time delay of 10 years.
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Because of the skewed distribution of time preference data, the
mean implied discount rates were higher: 10.7%, 3.5%, and
2.3%, respectively. A median yearly discount rate of 1.3% for the
time period 0–10 years and of 1.1% for the time period 0–40
years would imply a rate of 1.0% for the time period 10–40 years
from now.
Social Time Preference for Health, Money,
and Environment
In Figure 2 the cumulative distribution of time preference is
shown for health, monetary, and environmental beneﬁts with a
similar time delay. Social time preference was signiﬁcantly stron-
ger for money than for health (P = 0.001 for T = 5, P < 0.001 for
T = 10), and also signiﬁcantly stronger for environmental ben-
eﬁts than for health beneﬁts (P < 0.001). The proportion of
respondents with positive time preference for monetary beneﬁts
was at least 86% compared to at least 66% for health beneﬁts.
The higher preference for monetary beneﬁts at T = 5 compared
to T = 10 was signiﬁcant (P < 0.001). The median (mean)
implied discount rate for money was 6.6% (18.7%) for a 5-year
delay and 4.8% (11.2%) for a 10-year delay. The median (mean)
discount rate for environmental beneﬁts was 4.8% (11.2%) con-
sidering a 10-year delay. Time preferences for health and money
were signiﬁcantly (P < 0.001) correlated at the individual level,
with Spearman’s rank correlation of 0.36 for T = 5 and of 0.33
for T = 10. The rank correlation between time preference for
health and environmental beneﬁts was even stronger (0.50), and
lower between time preference for monetary and environmental
beneﬁts (0.30). These rank correlations were lower than those
within the health and monetary domains for different delays
(0.82 and 0.49 within health domain, 0.69 within monetary
domain).
Determinants of Time Preference
We tested the associations of a number of background charac-
teristics with social time preference. Of these, only age was
consistently associated, with higher ages having a stronger social
time preference in all domains. After adjusting for age, signiﬁcant
differences in social time preference for health and environmental
beneﬁts were found for job type, with medical doctors and sci-
entiﬁc personnel having the weakest time preference. Social time
preference differed not signiﬁcantly between policymakers and
health-care workers in any domain (Table 3).
Validity Checks
In addition to investigating inconsistent answers and assessing
the “face validity” of the results, we analyzed the correspondence
between elicited time preference and the responses to the propo-
sitions regarding the importance of future health included in the
questionnaire. In general, this correspondence was weak
although in the right direction. The proposition “If possible, we
should invest in the health of future generations” was signiﬁ-
cantly associated with time preference for health and in the
expected direction, i.e., stronger agreement was associated with
lower discount rates.
From the debrieﬁngs with eight respondents we understood
that they had generally been dedicated and committed to the
task. One respondent had interpreted the health scenarios as a
stream of beneﬁts during the speciﬁed time period instead of a
one-off beneﬁt. Respondents had been able to assume a decision-
maker’s perspective, although some found it difﬁcult to place
themselves in a “dictator’s position.” Two respondents indicated
that personal experiences with illness had inﬂuenced their choice,
notwithstanding the instructions. Two respondents remarked
Figure 2 Cumulative percentage of respondents who prefer future beneﬁts.
————— health beneﬁts
– – – – – – – monetary beneﬁts
···················· environmental beneﬁts
Table 3 Median implied time preference rates by background variables
Health
(T = 5)
Money
(T = 5)
Age
<30 0.0135* 0.0523*
30–39 0.0271 0.0664
40–49 0.0392 0.0994
50+ 0.0664 0.0664
Sex
Males 0.0271 NS 0.0664 NS
Females 0.0231 0.0664
Education
Low 0.0068 NS 0.0523†
High 0.0271 0.0664
Job
General, administrative 0.0818† 0.0818 NS
Scientiﬁc, medical doctors 0.0135 0.0664
Nurses, paramedical personnel 0.0271 0.0664
Policymakers 0.0271 0.0664
Children
Yes, living at home 0.0271 NS 0.0664†
Yes, not living at home 0.0664 0.0818
No 0.0135 0.0523
Religious
No 0.0190 NS 0.0664 NS
Yes 0.0271 0.0664
Health
Less than good 0.0818 NS 0.0818 NS
(Very) good 0.0231 0.0664
Health behavior‡
<Median score 0.0271 NS 0.0664 NS
Median score 0.0190 0.0664
Smoking
Current smoker 0.0664 NS 0.0664†
Previous smoker 0.0523 0.0818
Nonsmoker 0.0190 0.0523
Yearly income
<€30,000 0.0000† 0.0523 NS
€30,000 0.0392 0.0664
Unknown 0.0231 0.0664
*P < 0.01, †0.01 < P < 0.05 as determined by nonparametric testing (Kruskal–Wallis, Mann–
Whitney).
‡Summary measure of scores on physical activity, smoking, and consumption of fruit, veg-
etables, and fat.
NS, not signiﬁcant.
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that the results from the trade-off should not be interpreted as
exact preferences, but rather as an order of magnitude.
Discussion
We set out to empirically derive societal discount rates for health
and money, which could, in principle, feed into economic evalu-
ations of health-care interventions. Using a highly standardized
questionnaire, we found that social time preference demon-
strated a large variation in a population of health-care workers
and policymakers. The majority of our sample had neutral or a
weakly positive time preference for health. Social time preference
was stronger for monetary and environmental beneﬁts than for
population health beneﬁts. This ﬁnding contrasts many previous
studies, although it is not unique [24], and is in line with recent,
more normative pleas for a lower discount rate for health relative
to that of money. Moreover, in all domains the implied annual
discount rates decreased with the delay period. Age was posi-
tively associated with social time preference in all domains. Poli-
cymakers’ time preferences did not differ signiﬁcantly from those
of health-care workers.
In our analysis we used, following a “majority vote,” the
median values of future compared to present beneﬁts and the
corresponding yearly discount rate as a measure of social time
preference. The mean values and other descriptive statistics were
given for statistical reasons, to illustrate that the distribution of
time preferences appeared to be rather skewed. The implied
social discount rates in this study were calculated by a constant
exponential discounting function and were generally lower than
found in most other studies, both for health [25–30] and for
money [30], but were similar as those found by West et al. [24].
Our observation that the discount rate decreases with time delay
is consistent with the majority of the studies. This would imply
that more distant health beneﬁts and costs are discounted at a
lower rate than those more nearby in time.
We found a signiﬁcantly lower discount rate for health ben-
eﬁts than for monetary beneﬁts. This domain effect was con-
ﬁrmed by the ﬁnding that time preference for an environmental
good (i.e., noise pollution) was also stronger. Several studies
employing a social perspective reported higher discount rates
for health compared to money [28–31], although one found
lower median discount rates for health [24]. We hypothesize
that most differences between our results and other studies cited
above may be explained by differences in study population (stu-
dents and general public vs. health-care workers and policymak-
ers) and by differences in framing. Framing issues include the
general presentation of the choices, the transparency of phras-
ings, the response mode, and the deﬁnition of the decision-
maker’s perspective.
A novelty of this study was the use of a computer-based
questionnaire that could be accessed via the Internet. Compared
to paper questionnaires that have been commonly used in time
preference elicitation studies, this facilitated the use of interactive
choice tasks and has likely increased analyzable response. A
minority of 14% of respondents would have preferred a paper
questionnaire. Whether the elicitation procedure inﬂuenced
responses could not be tested further.
The scenarios in the choice tasks were deliberately framed
from a social perspective, because this resembles the mainstream
perspective in economic evaluations of health interventions. The
appropriate source of preferences for determining social time
preference is debated, with some arguing that individual time
preferences should be used [3], whereas others criticize the rel-
evance of the rationale for individual time preference for public
choices [15]. The social preference for the timing of population
health beneﬁts is quite different from individual preferences with
respect to own health.
A number of limitations of our study deserve mentioning.
First, in spite of the careful design of our study, inconsistencies in
responses and misunderstandings of choice tasks occurred, yet
only in a minority of respondents. Excluding inconsistent
responders did not substantially alter the results. Possible expla-
nations for these inconsistencies might be lack of numeracy and
unfamiliarity with the type of exercise used.
Second, although respondents in general appeared to be able
to assume being an independent societal decision-maker, this may
not have completely precluded the inﬂuence of individual char-
acteristics or perspectives, as the ﬁndings in the limited debrieﬁng
also emphasize. We for instance found that social time preference
was associated with the respondent’s age, with older people less
willing to trade present for future population health.
Third, the ﬁrst two parts of the choice experiments—the
rating scale and the question about whether respondents were
willing to trade—were only offered in the choices with health
outcomes. This may have had an impact on the differences in
elicited time preference between domains. Respondents who
were unwilling to trade would have likely traded if they were not
presented the rating scale and were forced to participate in the
titration task.
Fourth, the study sample consisted of health-care workers
and policymakers that likely constitute a heterogeneous group in
terms of values, beliefs, and preferences. Nevertheless, the sample
is not representative for the general population. Particularly, the
elderly were missing and the average level of education was high.
The choice for our sample was a deliberate one, as we wanted an
informed sample. Nevertheless, because age and time preference
are positively associated while the elderly were underrepresented
in our study, deviations in preferences from the general popula-
tion cannot be excluded. West and colleagues found that health
professionals tended to discount the future more than the public
[24]. Although we encourage performing similar studies in the
general population, investigators have to take into account that
the complexity of decision tasks similar to those presented here
demand a level of decision-making performance, (health) literacy,
and numeracy skills that is not achieved by all [32,33].
Fifth, unlike the health and monetary scenarios, the environ-
mental scenarios contained speciﬁc interventions (noise barriers
vs. asphalt). Preference for the type of intervention may therefore
have inﬂuenced the observed time preference. Because a stronger
preference was observed for noise barriers with immediate ben-
eﬁts, and assuming that people dislike noise barriers more than
noise reducing asphalt for esthetic reasons, time preference may
even be stronger for the environmental domain than observed
here.
As mentioned above, our results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of other
empirical studies that support (some sort of) a hyperbolic dis-
count function with higher discount rates for short delays and
lower ones for long delays. Whether it is desirable to reﬂect this
common ﬁnding in guidelines for discounting in economic evalu-
ations remains open for debate. Although not common practice,
for the jurisdiction in which National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence operates a declining discount rate was pro-
posed by the Treasury [1].
Summarizing, the implied social discount rates for health in
our study were lower than those for money and were generally
lower than those used in economic evaluations of health care
(predominantly 3–5%) or in guidelines. This corresponds with
theoretical arguments in favor of a lower discount rate for health
beneﬁts than for money in economic evaluations [8]. When this
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would be adopted in guidelines, this will have far reaching impli-
cations for the allocation of health-care resources. A further
discussion is required of current discounting guidelines, fueled by
theoretical and empirical evidence.
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